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The Right of [All] the People to Be Secure: Extending




Almost 2,000,000 adults1 were on probation2 or parole3 in the
United States in 1984. The primary purpose of probation and parole is to
rehabilitate the offender by placing him back into the community.4 The
release into the community, however, is not without restriction; in virtu-
ally every case, conditions accompany the release of the probationer or
parolee.5 To be valid, the conditions attached to the release must "rea-
* Member, Third Year Class.
1. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES: 1987, at 173.
2. Probation is a sentence imposed by the court by which the convicted person is condi-
tionally released into the community under the supervision of a probation agent before the
defendant actually serves time in jail. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1082 (5th ed. 1979).
3. Parole is a conditional release from jail, prison, or other confinement after the defend-
ant has actually served part of his sentence. Id. at 1006. Probation and parole agents super-
vise the convict to ensure that he follows the conditions attached to his release.
The power to grant, deny, or revoke parole in the federal system lies in the United States
Parole Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1985). The equivalent probationary powers lie in the
federal judiciary. Id. § 3651. Federal probation officers supervise parolees as well as proba-
tioners. See id. §§ 3655, 4203.
4. Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980). There is no constitutional
right to either probation or parole. Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 213 (1937); Escoe v.
Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935). A court may grant probation only when both the individ-
ual's and the public's interests are served best by suspension of the sentence rather than
incarceration:
Upon entering ajudgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or life
imprisonment, any court ... when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best
interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the
imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period [not longer than five years] and upon such terms and conditions as the court
deems best.... Probation may be granted whether the offense is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both.
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1985).
5. Common conditions of probation and parole include obeying all laws, refraining from
alcohol use, avoiding association with other convicts, reporting to a probation agent on a regu-
lar schedule, and advising the probation agent of any change in address or employment. See,
e-g., Higdon, 627 F.2d at 898 (reporting requirements); United States v. Miller, 549 F.2d 105,
107 (9th Cir. 1976) (no alcohol); Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1242-43 (2d Cir. 1972) (no
association with other convicts); United States v. Cates, 402 F.2d 473, 477 (4th Cir. 1968)
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sonably relate" to the twin goals of probation and parole: rehabilitation
of the offender and protection of the public.6 If the probationer or pa-
rolee fails to obey valid conditions, his probation or parole may be re-
voked and he may be sent to prison. 7
One frequently imposed condition of probation or parole requires
the probationer or parolee to submit to searches at any time and at any
(must remain within state and "obey each and every direction of the United States Probation
Officer"); see also United States v. Rea, 678 F.2d 382, 384 n.1 (2d Cir. 1982) (list of standard
conditions of probation); Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294, 1296 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (same);
18 U.S.C. § 4209 (1985) (same).
6. See United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236 (10th Cir. 1982) (Although a judge
has broad discretion to impose conditions of probation reasonably related to rehabilitating the
defendant and protecting the public, he may not require defendant to pay a contribution to a
group unharmed by his crime.); Higdon, 627 F.2d at 898-900 (Although imposing conditions
that probationer forfeit all his property, as well as work full-time for a charity for three years,
is punitive rather than rehabilitative or protective, imposing only one of these conditions may
be permissible.).
Courts have applied a "reasonable relation" test to validate conditions that infringe parol-
ees' fourth amendment rights. See Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366 (1lth Cir. 1982);
United States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Consuelo-Gonza-
lez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 249-50 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975); People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 764, 488 P.2d 630, 632-33, 97
Cal. Rptr. 302, 304-05 (1971). Courts give more careful scrutiny, however, to conditions that
restrict first amendment rights. See, e.g., Birzon, 469 F.2d at 1243 (condition restricting free-
dom of association valid if "reasonably and necessarily related" to goals of probation); Sobell,
327 F. Supp. at 1303-04 (compelling need standard for condition restricting freedom of
speech); see also Note, Probation Conditions and the First Amendment: When Reasonableness is
Not Enough, 17 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 45 (1981) (authored by Bruce D. Greenburg)
(history of probation with special attention to restrictions on first amendment rights); Com-
ment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282, 313-39 (1971) (general discussion of condi-
tions limiting first amendment rights).
This Note argues that, since the fourth amendment is a fundamental right that is implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty (see infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text), a compelling
need test should also apply to conditions infringing parolees' fourth amendment rights.
7. One uniformly imposed condition of probation or parole is that the convict obey all
the laws of the jurisdiction. A court may revoke probation or parole when it is "reasonably
satisfied" that a the convict has violated state or federal law. Neither actual conviction of the
underlying crime nor proof beyond a reasonable doubt the court will require. United States v.
Rice, 671 F.2d 455, 458 (11 th Cir. 1982); United States v. Cates, 402 F.2d 473, 474 (4th Cir.
1968). Because the burden of proof is much lighter in a revocation hearing than in a full-
fledged criminal trial, prosecutors will often seek probation revocation and subsequent incar-
ceration rather than pursue a new criminal prosecution. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
479 (1972); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 819-20 (7th Cir. 1971) (Fairchild, J., dissent-
ing); see also Seymore v. Beto, 383 F.2d 384, 384 (5th Cir. 1967) (proper to revoke probation
on basis of charge subsequently dismissed by prosecution because of insufficient evidence); In
re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 653, 463 P.2d 734, 742, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 390 (1970) (Peters, J.,
dissenting) ("When the cost of prosecution in terms of time and money is considered too high,
and when the parolee still has a considerable time to serve on his original sentence, the People
will often forego a new criminal trial and instead will look to the parole revocation to serve the
ends of a new conviction.").
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place.8 Even when such a condition is not expressly imposed, courts
have allowed probation and parole searches without either probable
cause or a search warrant.9 In effect, these courts strip probationers and
parolees of standard fourth amendment protections.
In Griffin v. Wisconsin, '0 the first United States Supreme Court rul-
ing on the proper scope of probationers' fourth amendment rights, " the
Court relied on a state regulation that authorized probation searches on
the basis of "reasonable grounds" to uphold a search of a probationer's
home conducted without either probable cause or a search warrant.'
2
The Court, however, refused to create a general "probation search" ex-
ception to the fourth amendment's safeguards. The Court also declined
to decide whether it would uphold restrictions on a probationer's privacy
that are only " 'reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest,'"
or whether it would restrict the government's searches under a strict
scrutiny standard.
13
This Note argues that courts should not restrict fundamental fourth
amendment rights simply because the individual is a probationer or pa-
rolee. Fundamental rights should be limited only when necessary to ef-
fectuate compelling state interests. Furthermore, even when the
government objectives are compelling, the state should use only those
methods that are narrowly tailored to achieve its ends. Because the state
can use means that are less restrictive of constitutional rights, the govern-
ment should not have the power to conduct probation and parole
searches without a warrant and probable cause.
This Note first presents an overview of fourth amendment protec-
tions for the general public. Next, the Note examines the current status
of probationer's and parolee's fourth amendment rights. The Note then
examines five theories that have been used to justify limitations on pa-
rolee's fourth amendment rights. After presenting and criticizing the
three older theories of constructive custody, act of grace, and explicit
8. See, e.g., Owens v. Kelley, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982); People v. Bravo, 43
Cal. 3d 600, 692, 738 P.2d 336, 336-37, 238 Cal. Rptr. 282, 282-83 (1987); People v. Kern, 264
Cal. App. 2d 962, 71 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1968).
9. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3167-68 (1987); Latta v. Fitzharris,
521 F.2d 246, 249-50 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
10. 107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987).
11. The Court has denied certiorari in several cases involving probationer's and parolee's
fourth amendment rights. See, e.g., Latta, 521 F.2d at 246; United States ex rel. Santos v. New
York State Bd. of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1972);
People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
953 (1965); State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533 (Iowa), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970).
12. Probation officers searched Griffin's home after receiving a telephone tip from some-
one claiming to be a police officer. The tipster told the probation agent that Griffin may have
had guns in his apartment. Griffin, 107 S. Ct. at 3175 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Four Jus-
tices dissented from the majority opinion upholding the search.
13. Id. at 3168 n.2 (quoting O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (1987)).
waiver, the Note describes the protections that even courts using these
theories concede to probationers and parolees. It then presents and criti-
cizes the two more modern theories of "diminished expectation of pri-
vacy" and "administrative search"; the two theories that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court used to uphold the search in Griffin. 14 The United States
Supreme Court declined to use the diminished expectation of privacy
theory and instead relied on the administrative search theory to affirm
the Wisconsin decision.1 5 In this discussion, the Note argues that parol-
ees have legitimate expectations of privacy and that the government must
demonstrate a "compelling interest" before abridging their fourth
amendment rights. Although the state interest in rehabilitating convicts
may be compelling, blanket denials of fundamental fourth amendment
rights are not narrowly tailored to meet the state's important interests in
rehabilitating the probationer and protecting the public. Means less de-
structive of constitutional freedoms, such as visitation and reporting re-
quirements, are available to the government. Since blanket denials of
fourth amendment rights unnecessarily impinge privacy rights, they are
unconstitutional.
In addition to the constitutional arguments, the Note argues that
limiting privacy rights is unwise public policy when other alternatives are
open to the government. Limits on privacy may hinder, rather than pro-
mote, rehabilitation. Furthermore, since the public's best protection lies
in the offender's rehabilitation, unwarranted searches harm the protec-
tive, as well as the rehabilitative goals of probation.
The Note concludes by proposing that courts apply a "compelling
interest" and "narrowly tailored means" test to conditions limiting pro-
bationer's and parolee's fourth amendment rights. This Note also pro-
poses that courts extend the exclusionary rule to revocation hearings.
I. Fourth Amendment Protection for the Public at Large
The fourth amendment 1 6 protects an individual's legitimate expecta-
14. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 54-55, 388 N.W.2d 535, 540 (1986), aff'd, 107
S. Ct. 3164, 3168 (1987).
15. Griffin, 107 S. Ct. at 3167.
16. The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The fourth amendment applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
Many courts have treated probationers and parolees identically in discussions of their
fourth amendment rights. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 729 F.2d 120, 125 n.1 (2d Cir.
1984); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265-66 (9th Cir. 1975); People v.
Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 171, 174, 385 N.E.2d 621, 623, 412 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (1978). Arguably,
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tion of privacy 17 against arbitrary state intrusion by requiring that all
searches and seizures1 8 be reasonable. Both civil and criminal searches
are subject to the fourth amendment's limits.19
Although the fourth amendment's underlying command is that all
searches be "reasonable," traditional fourth amendment jurisprudence
measures reasonableness in terms of the warrant clause.20 Police must
have both probable cause and a search warrant to conduct a valid
search.21 A search without a warrant is per se unreasonable and there-
fore unconstitutional unless it falls within one of the "'few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions'" to the warrant
requirement. 22
parolees should be treated differently than, probationers since the initial jail sentence may
reflect a judge's assessment of the gravity of the offense or the continued dangerousness of the
convict. It may be true that, as a class, convicts sentenced to prison are more dangerous than
the class of probationers. By deciding to grant parole, however, the state demonstrates its
judgment that the parolee, as an individual, is rehabilitable. Once this judgment is reached,
the classes of parolees and probationers should be treated alike. The state has the same inter-
est of rehabilitation in both the probationer and the parolee. Differences in the amount of
protection the public requires are better dealt with on an individual basis in the determination
of probable cause in the "totality of the circumstances" (see infra notes 35-37, 179-80 and
accompanying text) rather than by blithely classifying parolees as more dangerous than proba-
tioners. Since the arguments set forth in this Note apply equally to both probationers and
parolees, this Note will use the terms "probationer" and "parolee" interchangeably.
17. Before fourth amendment protections apply, a person must have an expectation of
privacy that society is "'prepared to recognize as legitimate.'" New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 338 (1985) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)).
18. A fourth amendment search occurs "'when an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable is infringed.'" United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712
(1984) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). A fourth amendment
seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory rights in that property. Id. A fourth amendment seizure of aperson occurs when a
reasonable person would think that he was not free to leave. I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,
216 (1984).
19. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967). In New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325 (1985), the Court stated:
Because the individual's interest in privacy and personal security "suffers whether
the government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches
of other statutory or regulatory standards," it would be "anomalous to say that the
individual and his private property are fully protected by the fourth amendment only
when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."
469 U.S. at 335 (quoting Marshall, 436 U.S. at 312-313 and Camara, 387 U.S. at 530) (cita-
tions omitted).
20. The warrant clause provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1979); United States v. United
States Dist. Court (Plamondon), 407 U.S. 297, 315-17 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 449-50 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
22. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967));
see also infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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A warrant must be issued by a neutral, detached magistrate, 23 who
may grant the warrant only upon a showing of probable cause. 24 Before a
magistrate may find probable cause to search, the state must show facts
and circumstances that would lead a prudent person to believe that seiza-
ble evidence would be found in a particular location.2 5 Probable cause to
arrest requires facts and circumstances " 'sufficient to warrant a prudent
person's belief that the suspect had committed or was committing an
offense.' ",26 An applicant for a search warrant must provide the magis-
trate with sufficient and specific facts and circumstances to allow him to
evaluate independently whether probable cause exists. The magistrate is
not to act as a mere "rubber stamp" by approving the conclusory allega-
tions of the applicant. 27 To avoid the evils of a "general warrant" or
"writ of assistance,"'28 the warrant must particularly describe the items
sought and the locations in which the search is authorized.
The search warrant requirement serves as objective evidence that
the officer is legally authorized to conduct the search and prevents hind-
sight from coloring the evaluation of the reasonableness of the search.29
Most importantly, the warrant requirement limits the discretion exer-
cised by the searching officer by substituting the judgment of a neutral
and detached magistrate for that of the searching officer.
30
23. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 453 (1971); Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948)); Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
24. The magistrate must evaluate probable cause in the totality of the circumstances and
in a "nontechnical" manner. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983). Probable cause to
arrest does not necessarily mean there is probable cause to search, and vice versa. For instance,
the police may search an individual's home for evidence even though they do not suspect him
of having committed a crime. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 59 (1978).
The probable cause standard is the necessary and proper accommodation between individ-
uals' rights and the state's duty to control crime. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975).
Since in the absence of probable cause, a prudent person would not think that seizable evidence
would be found, a full search conducted on less than probable cause would be unreasonable.
25. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925).
26. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 111 (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)).
27. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 531-32 (1967); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 111 (1964).
28. Frequently used in colonial America, these instruments conferred unlimited powers
on officials to search for customs and tax violations. Popular resentment to these unlimited
intrusions into the colonists' privacy was one cause of the American Revolution. United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977); United States v. United States Dist. Court (Plamondon),
407 U.S. 297, 326-29 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481-85
(1965).
29. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 9; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565 (1976).
Whether probable cause exists is a question a magistrate must determine before issuing a war-
rant authorizing a search. This requirement reduces the temptation to use the fruits of a
search to justify the intrusion. A search conducted in violation of the Constitution cannot be
made lawful by the evidence that it uncovers. Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927).
30. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 110-11; United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932)
("Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search warrants
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A court may excuse the warrant requirement when some excep-
tional governmental need to search exists. This need, however, cannot be
merely the necessity for law enforcement. 31 In general, the warrant re-
quirement is excused only where the government has shown some exi-
gency that would make obtaining a warrant impossible. 32 For example,
an exigency exists when the time required to obtain a warrant may en-
danger a police officer 33 or lead to the destruction of evidence.
34
Even if a search falls into one of the carefully delineated exceptions
to the search warrant requirement, probable cause must still be present
to validate the search.35 Probable cause is a flexible standard that a court
than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the excite-
ment that attends the capture of persons accused of crime."). In Johnson v. United States, the
Supreme Court articulated the purpose behind the warrant requirement:
The point of the fourth amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reason-
able men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those infer-
ences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the
officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.
333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
31. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967).
32. The Supreme Court has outlined the issues a court should consider when deciding
whether an exception to the warrant requirement is appropriate:
In assessing whether the public interest demands creation of a general exception to
the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, the question is not whether the public
interest justifies the type of search in question, but whether the authority to search
should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the
burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind
the search.
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967).
The government has the burden of proving the necessity for an exemption from the war-
rant requirement. It will not meet this burden merely by showing that obtaining a warrant will
make enforcement somewhat more difficult. The government must show that imposition of
the warrant requirement will substantially frustrate the search. See id. at 532-33. Cf Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978) (no general murder scene exception).
For specific exceptions to the warrant requirement, see, for example, Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-68 (1971) (plain view); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-
63 (1969) (search of limited area valid incident to arrest); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27
(1968) (protective frisk for weapons valid on articulable suspicion).
33. Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
34. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966). For other examples of exigent
circumstances, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (hot pursuit); Ker v. Califor-
nia, 374 U.S. 23, 72 (1963) (disappearance or destruction of evidence); and Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (automobile exception).
35. In the absence of effective consent, probable cause is a minimum requirement for a
reasonable search permitted by the Constitution. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896
(1975); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 269-70 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
Consent excuses both the warrant and probable cause requirements. The state has the
burden of proving effective consent. For the consent to be "effective," the individual must
will evaluate in the totality of the circumstances.3 6 Police may use per-
sonal observations, hearsay reports, and previous contacts to establish
probable cause.
37
A. Fourth Amendment Safeguards for "Less Intrusive" Searches
In certain circumstances, the Supreme Court has applied a "sliding
scale"3 8 approach to probable cause. This approach examines the intru-
siveness of the search as well as the justification for the search to deter-
mine whether it is constitutional. Less intrusive searches require less
justification.
The Supreme Court has adopted this approach to justify protective
frisks for weapons by police officers39 as well as brief investigative
seizures. 40 In these cases, the Court has allowed minimal intrusions into
personal privacy on the basis of "reasonable suspicion. '4 1 Under the rea-
sonable suspicion standard, the officer must be able to articulate facts
that reasonably led him to believe that criminal activity was afoot.
42
have freely and voluntarily permitted the search. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
557 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
Probable cause is not a substitute for a search warrant. As a general rule, both probable
cause and a search warrant are required. Excusing one requirement does not necessarily jus-
tify excusing the other. See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958) ("were officers
free to search without a warrant merely upon probable cause to believe that certain articles
were within a home the provisions of the Fourth Amendment ... [would be] empty phrases,
and the protection it affords largely nullified."); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164,
3174 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("reduced need for review does not justify a complete
removal of the warrant requirement.").
36. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983).
37. Id.; Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 114 (1964).
38. This phrase is taken from R. ALLEN & R. KUHNS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 602 (1985).
39. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
40. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82, 884 (1975) (reasonable suspi-
cion required for investigative stop by roving patrol near border); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (articulable suspicion needed to stop car to check registration and li-
cense). Cf United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975) (either probable cause or con-
sent required to conduct full search of automobile near border); Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973) (objective facts required to justify brief investigative stop of
automobile by roving patrol but not for stop at functional equivalent of a border).
41. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 360 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
42. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. In most circumstances in which the sliding scale approach
applies, it would be impractical to obtain a search warrant. The delay necessary to obtain a
search warrant would usually frustrate the objectives of the search. But if it is practical to
obtain a warrant, the fact that the full measure of probable cause is not required does not mean
the judgment of a neutral magistrate should also be excused. See Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 528-39 (1967) (warrant required even though traditional probable cause stan-
dard is inapplicable). Excusing the warrant requirement just because a lower standard is sub-
stituted for the traditional standard of probable cause would leave even more discretion in the
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The sliding scale approach, however, only applies to searches that
are substantially less intrusive than a "full-blown" search. For more sig-
nificant intrusions into privacy, enforcement officers must satisfy the
measure of reasonableness provided by the Framers of the Constitution:
probable cause and a search warrant.
43
B. Administrative Searches
The Court also has engaged in a balancing process when the govern-
ment articulates important interests other than that in law enforcement,
such as health and safety code enforcement. Unlike the sliding scale ap-
proach that balances the extent of the intrusion against the facts justify-
ing the intrusion, the "administrative search theory" balances the
societal interest in conducting the search against the individual's interest
in maintaining his privacy.44 When the government conducts a search to
find violations of regulatory codes, 45 the Supreme Court sometimes has
been willing to defer to legislative judgments of reasonableness, 46 rather
than independently scrutinizing the search to see whether it meets the
hands of the searching officer. For example, the officer might act on a hunch or an otherwise
inadequate justification when conducting the search and later justify his actions by using the
evidence that the unlawful search uncovered. The warrant requirement should be excused
only when some exigency exists such that the delay caused by obtaining a warrant would
frustrate the object of the search. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 533; Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 761-62 (1969); Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
43. The Court allowed a full blown search on less than probable cause in New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). In T.L.O., the Court held that although students had a reason-
able expectation of privacy while in school, school officials could search a student's purse on
reasonable suspicion rather than on probable cause. The Court apparently felt that teachers
were too unfamiliar with the criminal process to evaluate accurately whether probable cause
existed. This reasoning fails because probable cause depends on whether a reasonable person,
not a hypertechnical magistrate, thinks seizable evidence would be found. Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213 (1983); see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 364 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In excusing the warrant requirement, the T.L.O. Court emphasized the
need to need to maintain school discipline through immediate action. Id. at 340. Cf. Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1984) (prison searches without probable cause or warrant
allowed because of the need to maintain security and discipline).
The T.L.O. reasoning does not apply to probation searches because (1) probation agents
are familiar with the criminal process and presumably the concept of probable cause and (2)
the need to maintain institutional security and discipline is absent since probationers live in the
community rather than in a prison or other institutional setting. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107
S. Ct. 3164, 3172 n.2 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. Administrative searches may be less intrusive than criminal searches. The Court has
weighed this factor when evaluating administrative searches of commercial premises. See, e.g.,
New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2642-43 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-
99 (1981).
45. The fact that a regulatory inspection may uncover evidence of a crime does not make
the search or the regulation unconstitutional or the evidence inadmissible. Burger, 107 S. Ct.
at 2651.
46. Griffin, 107 S. Ct. at 3167-68; Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S.
72, 77 (1970).
standard fourth amendment requirements of a warrant and particular-
ized 47 probable cause.
The Court's administrative search cases fall into three general cate-
gories. In the first category, the Court has adopted a less stringent stan-
dard of probable cause because enforcement of the traditional probable
cause standard would lead to an inadequate level of enforcement. 48 For
example, in Camara v. Municipal Court,49 the Court refused to apply the
traditional probable cause standard because inspectors could not gather
evidence of housing code violations unless they entered the dwelling. If
the Court had enforced the traditional probable cause standard, the in-
spectors would be placed in an impossible quandary: they could not
demonstrate probable cause without entering the building, but they could
not enter the building without first showing probable cause. Faced with
this dilemma, the Court held that the government need not show particu-
larized probable cause for this type of inspection, but only that a reason-
able legislative scheme existed and that the particular inspection fell
within the legislative scheme. The government could demonstrate the
necessity for inspection by showing either the general need for inspection
of buildings in the surrounding area or that the building itself had not
been inspected for some time, rather than by presenting evidence of the
actual condition of the particular building. 50
In this first category, then, the Court has required a search warrant,
but has allowed the warrant to issue on a showing much less demanding
than that required for a traditional criminal search warrant. 51 In these
cases, the Court emphasized that administrative searches intrude upon
fourth amendment interests. 52 To minimize the intrusion, the searching
party must obtain a warrant, unless such a requirement would frustrate
the governmental purpose behind the search.5 3 These cases recognize
that the fourth amendment's protections apply where Congress or an-
47. Probable cause must exist for each person searched. Mere association with, or prox-
imity to, a person being validly searched does not mean that the associate may also be
searched. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90-94 (1979).
48. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 537-38 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
49. 387 U.S. at 523.
50. Id. at 538.
51. The balancing process of this category is most analogous to the proper method for
analyzing the standard to be applied in probation and parole searches. But although the bal-
ancing process is similar, the outcome is different in the probation and parole search context.
See infra notes 154-61 and accompanying text.
52. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 530. Nevertheless, the Camara court found the search to be
constitutional, because the inspections were neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discov-
ery of evidence of a crime, and thus involved a relatively limited invasion of privacy. Id. at
537.
53. Id. at 533.
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other legislative body authorizes a search but fails to provide suitable
safeguards for fourth amendment interests.
In the second category of administrative search cases, the Court has
not required either probable cause or a warrant for inspections of perva-
sively regulated businesses.54 In this category, an individual's protec-
tions from "slight" invasions into legitimate fourth amendment
interests 55 are "outweighed" by important governmental interests that
can only be achieved by limiting fourth amendment rights. Detailed reg-
ulations serve to delineate the inspector's authority and the licensee's ob-
ligations.5 6 Therefore, the individual "is not left to wonder about the
purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task."
'5 7
For example, in United States v. Biswell, the Court approved a war-
rantless inspection of a licensed firearms dealer.58 The Court stressed
three factors: the limited nature of the privacy interest involved, 59 the
strong governmental interest in regulating firearms, 60 and the need for
frequent and unannounced inspections for effective enforcement.
61
54. See New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2643 (1987); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S.
594, 606 (1981); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972); Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
55. The injury to privacy interests is minimal since all the businesses in this category are
already pervasively regulated. Because of this pervasive regulation, the businesses are on notice
that they may be inspected without a warrant or probable cause. This notice is particularly
effective in minimizing damage to privacy interests when the government actually conducts
inspections regularly. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 599, 604 (1981).
56. These regulations delineate the scope and object of any search conducted necessary to
enforce the regulatory scheme. Both the searching official and the business owner are on no-
tice of the permissible scope of the search. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 311.
59. The Biswell Court stated:
It is also plain that inspections for compliance with the Gun Control Act pose
only limited threats to the dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy. When a dealer
chooses to engage in this pervasively regulated business and to accept a federal li-
cense, he does so with the knowledge that his business records, firearms, and ammu-
nition will be subject to effective inspection. Each licensee is annually furnished with
a revised compilation of ordinances that describe his obligations and define the in-
spector's authority. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(19). The dealer is not left to wonder about
the purposes of the inspector or the limits of his task.
Id. at 316.
The privacy interest in Biswell was minimal because of pervasive, rather than long-stand-
ing regulation. Cf. Colonnade, 397 U.S. at 75 (long history of regulation minimizes privacy
interest).
60. Biswell, 406 U.S. at 315 ("close scrutiny of [firearms] traffic is undeniably of central
importance to federal efforts to prevent violent crime and to assist the States in regulating the
firearms traffic within their borders").
61. Id. at 316 ("[Unannounced, even frequent inspections are essential.... [T]he prereq-
uisite of a warrant could easily frustrate inspection.").
In New York v. Burger, the Court stressed that a
warrantless inspection, ... even in the context of a pervasively regulated business,
In the third category of administrative search cases, the Court has
created an exception to the warrant requirement when administrative
safeguards adequately protect privacy interests. 62 In these cases, neutral
criteria for selecting the person or object to be searched remove the risk
of arbitrary actions by the searching officer. This category includes only
those searches that cause minimal intrusion into fourth amendment in-
terests. For example, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte authorized only
very limited investigative detentions at fixed roadblocks. 63 Searches,
even at fixed roadblocks, require a warrant and the full measure of prob-
able cause.
64
In all three categories of administrative search cases, the Court has
emphasized the need to limit the field officer's discretion. 65 Either a war-
rant, neutral criteria, or regulatory limits on the scope of the search must
limit the officer's power and discretion. 66
will be deemed to be reasonable only so long as three criteria are met. First, there
must be a "substantial" government interest .... Second, the warrantless inspections
must be "necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme." . . . Finally, "the statute's
inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, [must]
provid[e] a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant."
107 S. Ct. 2636, 2643-44 (1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
62. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 372-77 (1976); United States v. Marti-
nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558-60 (1976).
The administrative warrant requirement is also excused by "exigency." See, e.g., Michi-
gan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 293 (1984) (need to find cause of fire excused warrant require-
ment for short-time after fire was extinguished); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-10
(1978) (same).
63. The Court stated:
The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials
responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited
enforcement resources. . . . [Sluch officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class. And since field
officers may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for abu-
sive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of roving-patrol stops
(which may only be made on reasonable suspicion].
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559. Opperman authorizes routine inventory searches of im-
pounded automobiles. 428 U.S. at 364.
64. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975). When an automobile is the ob-
ject of the search, the automobile exception excuses the warrant requirement. Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). The officer, however, must still have probable cause
to conduct the search. Id. at 154.
A search conducted at a national border need not be based on probable cause because of
the compelling governmental interest in securing the nation's borders. Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973).
65. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967). The Camara Court
explained: "The practical effect of [warrantless administrative searches] is to leave the occu-
pant subject to the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the discretion to
invade private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a
disinterested party warrant the need to search." Id.
66. See, e.g., Opperman, 428 U.S. at 384 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[N]o significant discre-
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C. The Exclusionary Rule
Under the exclusionary rule, the trial court generally will exclude
evidence from the subsequent criminal trial gathered in violation of a
defendant's fourth amendment rights. 67 The exclusionary rule is a judi-
cially created remedy designed to safeguard fourth amendment rights of
the general public. The purpose behind the rule is to deter future consti-
tutional violations by the government, rather than to protect the personal
constitutional rights of the aggrieved party.
68
Because exclusion often results in the loss of highly probative evi-
dence, the Court has limited the remedy to those situations in which it
will have the maximum deterrent effect on enforcement officers. To de-
termine which situations merit application of the exclusionary rule, the
Court has established a balancing test that weighs the benefit gained (the
potential deterrent value of exclusion) 69 against the cost incurred (the
loss of probative evidence and the costs of litigating the legality of the
search). Applying this balancing test, the Court has ruled that the exclu-
sionary rule is inapplicable in grand jury proceedings, 70 civil cases, 71 and
deportation hearings.72 In all of these contexts, the Court found the cost
of exclusion too high and the benefit of the deterrent effect too slight to
merit application of the exclusionary remedy.
II. Fourth Amendment Protections as Fundamental Rights
As the preceding sections illustrate, the Framers of the Constitution
and the courts have gone to great lengths to assure adequate protection
of fourth amendment rights. Even where important state interests re-
quire some compromise of standard fourth amendment protections,
courts have substituted other protections to minimize injury to fourth
tion is placed in the hands of the individual officer: he usually has no choice as to the subject of
the search or its scope.").
67. In United States v. Calandra, the Court articulated this rationale: "'The rule is cal-
culated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter- to compel respect for the constitu-
tional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard
it.'" 414 U.S. at 347 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
Although the early formulations of the exclusionary rule also pointed out the need to
preserve "judicial integrity," the Court's recent majority opinions have tended to either ignore
or minimize this justification. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Calandra, 414
U.S. at 351-54, 356-60.
68. Id. at 348.
69. One factor the Court has weighed in measuring the benefit gained through exclusion
is whether the proceeding in which exclusion is sought is outside the "offending officer's zone
of primary interest." If it is outside his zone of interest or responsibility, exclusion will not
affect him enough to deter him from the same type of conduct in the future. United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 (1976).
70. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349-52.
71. Janis, 428 U.S. at 454.
72. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984).
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amendment interests. This type of strict scrutiny and obedience to
fourth amendment commandments secures and protects the right of all
"the people," whether they are guilty or innocent, to be free from unrea-
sonable searches.
73
In perhaps its most poignant language, the Court pointed out the
importance of fourth amendment freedoms:
It is well to recall the words of Mr. Justice Jackson, soon after his
return from the Nuremberg Trials: "These [fourth amendment rights],
I protest, are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of
indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so ef-
fective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and
putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of
the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary
government."
74
The Court has repeatedly stressed that the guaranties of the fourth
amendment are the
very essence of constitutional liberty ... [and are] as important and as
imperative as are the guaranties of the other fundamental rights of the
individual citizen.... [The fourth amendment] should receive a liberal
construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment ... or gradual
depreciation of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of
courts, or by well-intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive
officers.
75
Courts protect these fundamental rights by adhering strictly to the
fourth amendment's warrant and probable cause requirements. Unless
the search falls within one of the specifically delineated and jealously
guarded exceptions to the fourth amendment's requirements, the search-
ing officer must procure a warrant supported by probable cause.
III. Current Status of Probationers' and Parolees' Fourth
Amendment Rights
Despite the Supreme Court's strong language concerning the "fun-
73. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,
453 (1948).
74. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1973) (quoting Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
75. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921); see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
650 (1961); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383, 392 (1914); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)) (" 'No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control
of his own person, free from all interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.' "); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) ("The security of one's privacy
against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at the core of the fourth amendment-is
basic to a free society ... [and is] implicit in 'the concept of ordered liberty.' ") (quoting Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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damental" nature of these rights, most courts have failed to carefully
scrutinize conditions of release that limit probationers' and parolees'
fourth amendment rights. Traditionally, courts have afforded probation-
ers and parolees little or no fourth amendment protection. Some courts
have held that parolees and probationers may be searched at any time by
any probation officer.76 Others have validated searches that are based on
"reasonable grounds" 77 or that are "reasonably related to a probation
agent's duties."' 78 In two different cases, the Ninth Circuit has even inti-
mated that a search may be based upon a mere "hunch. '79 All of these
standards fall well below the probable cause standard required to search
other individuals of the general public. In addition to denying probation-
ers protections of the probable cause standard, most courts also eliminate
the safeguards of the warrant clause by not requiring probation agents to
obtain a warrant before conducting a search. 8
0
A. Theories Used to Justify Limiting Probationers' and Parolees' Fourth
Amendment Rights
Courts have used several theories to strip fourth amendment protec-
tions from probationers and parolees. Although the older theories of
"constructive custody," "act of grace," and "explicit waiver" 81 have been
soundly criticized by commentators, 82 courts continue to apply these the-
ories, either alone or in conjunction with more modem rationales.
83
Courts that have discarded the three older theories generally rely on two
76. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10, 15 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971); People v. Mason,
5 Cal. 3d 759, 762-63, 488 P.2d 630, 631, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 304 (1971); People v. Hernandez,
229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 150, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965).
77. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 61, 388 N.W.2d 535, 542, aff'd, 107 S.
Ct. 3164, 3169-70 (1987).
78. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975);
United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 266 (9th Cir. 1975).
79. Latta, 521 F.2d at 250; Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 266.
80. See, eg., Griffin, 107 S. Ct. at 3169-70; Latta, 521 F.2d at 246, 250; Consuelo-Gonza-
lez, 521 F.2d at 259; United States ex rel. Santos v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 441 F.2d at
1216, 1217-18 (2d Cir. 1971); People v. Bravo, 43 Cal. 3d 600, 600-01, 738 P.2d 336, 336-37,
238 Cal. Rptr. 282, 282-83 (1987); People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 150, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 100, 104 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965); People v. Denne, 141 Cal. App. 2d
499, 510, 297 P.2d 451, 458 (1956).
81. See infra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., White, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Parolees and Probationers, 31 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 167, 176-81 (1969); Comment, supra note 6, at 282; Note, Extending Search and
Seizure Protection to Parolees in California, 22 STAN. L. REV. 129, 132-34 (1969) (authored by
William R. Rapson).
83. See infra notes 114-60 and accompanying text. For an example of a court using a
combination of theories to justify its result, see People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 764-66, 488
P.2d 630, 632-34, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 305 (1971) (using consent, reduced expectation of privacy,
and act of grace).
more modern approaches, "diminished expectation of privacy" and "ad-
ministrative search," to limit probationer's and parolee's fourth amend-
ment rights. Like their older counterparts, the modern theories fail to
recognize the fundamental nature of fourth amendment rights and, there-
fore, do not adequately explain why these rights should be stripped from
probationers and parolees.
(1) Older Theories
Older theories used to justify limitations on probationer's fourth
amendment rights include "constructive custody," "act of grace," and
''explicit waiver."
a. Constructive Custody
The constructive custody theory is premised on the idea that,
although a probationer or parolee is not physically confined, she techni-
cally remains under the ultimate control of the correctional system and is
therefore in "custody."18 4 While in technical custody, the argument runs,
probationers and parolees are entitled to no more rights than people ac-
tually behind prison walls. Since a prisoner has no legitimate expectation
of privacy in his prison cell, 85 a probationer or parolee has no expectation
of privacy in her home.
In People v. Hernandez, 8 6 for example, a California court used the
constructive custody theory to uphold a parole officer's warrantless
search of a parolee's car even though the officer had no probable cause to
search. At the time of the Hernandez decision, parolees could be ar-
rested and returned to prison without probable cause, notice, or a hear-
ing.87 The court reasoned that the extensive power to seize a parolee
carried with it the less intrusive power to search:
[Tihe authorities may subject [the parolee], his home and his effects to
such . . . inspection and search as may seem advisable to them.
Neither the fourth amendment nor the parallel guaranty in [the state]
Constitution block[s] that scrutiny. He may not assert these guaran-
ties against the correctional authorities who supervise him on parole.
... If this constitutional fact strips him of constitutional protection
against invasions of privacy by his parole officer, the answer is that he
84. Statutes often refer to the sentence of probation as remanding the convict to the cus-
tody of the Attorney General for the term of probation. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3056 (West
1982); Comment, supra note 6, at 287-88. This phrasing may explain the durability of the
constructive custody theory.
85. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 530 (1984).
86. 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149-50, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 103-04 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
953 (1965).
87. Id. at 148, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 103 ("The parolee, although physically outside the walls,
is still a prisoner; his apprehension, although outwardly resembling arrest, is simply a return to
physical custody.").
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has at least as much protection as he had within the prison walls.
88
The error in this argument is its assumption that the state deprives
the prisoner of his privacy rights merely as an incident of "custody." In
fact, the deprivation of privacy inside a prison derives from the state's
compelling interest in maintaining prison security and discipline.89
Thus, the analogy between prisoners on the one hand, and parolees and
probationers on the other, falls apart. The legal fiction of constructive
custody fails to recognize differences between the expectations and physi-
cal surroundings of prisoners and parolees as well as the different state
interests involved.
90
Prisoners are subject to searches for weapons, drugs, and illicit com-
munications because of the need to maintain security and discipline in
the highly regulated prison environment. Searches are necessary both to
protect guards and prisoners from violence and to control potential riots
and escape attempts. These compelling needs have led courts to hold
that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in a prison cell. 9 ' This
holding, however, does not mean that prisoners do not expect some mea-
sure of privacy in their personal effects. Rather, any subjective expecta-
tion of privacy that a prisoner may have in his personal effects is
constitutionally unprotected because society is unwilling to recognize the
prisoner's privacy interest in the face of the compelling state interest in
maintaining prison security.
92
Probation and parole searches, however, do not involve the same
88. Id. at 149-50, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
89. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1984). In Hudson, the Supreme Court
held that the fourth amendment does not apply in a prison cell because society demands that a
prisoner's expectation of privacy must give way to the overriding state interest in maintaining
secure prisons. Id. at 528. Therefore, any expectation of privacy held by a prisoner is "illegiti-
mate" and without constitutional protection. Although not upholding an expectation of pri-
vacy, the Hudson analysis demonstrates that the government cannot strip away fundamental
constitutional privacy rights without having an objective and compelling reason for its actions.
Merely informing an individual that he may be searched at any time will not make his expecta-
tion of privacy "illegitimate."
The Supreme Court has recently held that prison regulations need only reasonably relate
to a "legitimate penological interest," emphasizing that prison security is a compelling interest
best served by deference to prison administrators' experience and discretion. O'Lone v. Estate
of Shabazz, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2404 (1987); Turner v. Safley, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (1987).
The Court relied on a similar reasonableness test to uphold a probation search based on a
telephone tip. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3167 (1987). Yet in the probation setting,
the compelling interests of maintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and
discipline inside prison walls are absent. Nevertheless, the Court used this lax reasonable rela-
tion test to limit a probationer's constitutional rights. See id. at 3172 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that reasonable relation test need not be used to evaluate probation
conditions since probationers are not in confinement).
90. See In re Martinez, I Cal. 3d 641, 646, 463 P.2d 734, 737, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 385-86;
White, supra note 82 at 180; Note, supra note 82, at 133.
91. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 525-28.
92. Id. at 526; see also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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considerations. 93 Rather than living in a highly regulated prison envi-
ronment, parolees live in free society and, for the most part, may conduct
themselves as do members of the public at large. Like members of the
general public, they do not expect to be searched whenever they return to
their home. The state has no compelling interest in regulating the pa-
rolee's home environment to prevent escapes and riots. Although the
state does possess an interest in preventing an unauthorized departure
from the jurisdiction, this type of an escape does not entail the physical
danger present in a prison break-out. Furthermore, the need to prevent
and detect other crimes is the same law enforcement interest as that of
preventing any crime committed by members of the general public.
94
Probation and parole agents, therefore, should rely on the same
tools available to combat crime by other members of the public. The
need to supervise probationers and parolees does not justify stripping
them of fourth amendment protections. When courts allow police to
conduct searches in the name of more efficient law enforcement or simply
for the sake of deterrence, American society returns to the evils of gen-
eral warrants and writs of assistance. 95 The courts should not so lightly
abandon fundamental constitutional protections.
b. Act of Grace and Implied Consent
The act of grace or implied consent rationale assumes that, since the
state need not grant either parole or probation, the state may attach
whatever conditions it desires to the privilege. Courts also use this ra-
tionale to deny probationers and parolees standing to complain about the
conditions attached to the act of grace. Courts that use this approach
reason that the probationer implicitly has consented to the condition by
accepting probation rather than choosing prison.
96
The error in this argument lies in the assumption that the absolute
power to grant or withhold parole necessarily includes the power to
grant parole with conditions that infringe upon constitutional rights.
Constitutional rights do not depend on whether a government benefit is
93. See Note, supra note 82, at 133.
94. That parolees have a high rate of recidivism should not freely license enforcement
agents to use unconstitutional methods for combating crime. Allowing searches of a parolee or
probationer that would be unconstitutional if carried out on a member of the general public
would be a dangerous precedent. Such a precedent easily could extend to groups other than
probationers and parolees, such as convicts who have already served their sentences and resi-
dents of high crime areas.
95. See supra note 28.
96. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10, 15 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971); People v. Denne,
141 Cal. App. 2d 499, 510, 297 P.2d 451, 458 (1956). Cf Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778,
781-82 (1973) (due process rights attach to revocation hearing).
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characterized as a "right" or a "privilege."' 97 Since the state may not
attach unconstitutional conditions to the grant of state privileges, there
must be an independent justification for the deprivation of constitutional
rights.
In addition, the act of grace theory erroneously assumes that the
parole and probation systems exist merely for the benefit of the convict.
Rather, conditional release is an important penological tool that serves
the state's interests in rehabilitating criminals and, by so doing, in pro-
tecting society. Conditional releases are also more cost-effective than
prolonged incarceration. 98 By releasing prisoners, or by letting convicts
avoid prison altogether, the state also eases the acute prison overcrowd-
ing problem. 99
c. Explicit Waiver
The explicit waiver theory arises from the concept that an individual
may waive his constitutional rights. 1°° States that follow this rationale
condition parole or probation on the convict's explicit waiver of his
fourth amendment rights. Under this theory, when the convict agrees to
a search condition, he enters into the equivalent of a parole or probation
"contract" and effectively gives up his fourth amendment rights.101
97. See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitu-
tional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
98. Jail costs in the United States averaged over $10,500 per inmate in 1984. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, supra note 1, table 304, at 172.
99. See Comment, supra note 6, at 294 ("[Parole] is the implementation of a correctional
policy and is no more a matter of grace than the decision to rehabilitate a slum or locate a
highway."); see also People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965). In Hernandez, the court stated:
At this point we confront authorities theorizing that parole is an act of grace, accept-
ance of which entails the voluntary surrender or curtailment of constitutional rights.
The rationale is not particularly appealing .... A better doctrine is that the state
may not attach unconstitutional conditions to the grant of state privileges. The prob-
lem should be approached by considering what guaranties the individual may claim
as a paroled prisoner of the state, not what constitutional liberties he surrendered as a
condition of parole.
Id. at 148, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 103 (citations omitted).
Even though Hernandez properly rejected the act of grace theory, the court asked the
wrong question to arrive at the result. Rather than asking what guaranties the parolee may
claim, the court should have asked what constitutional guaranties the state may deny. This
question would properly emphasize the fundamental nature of fourth amendment rights and
focus the court's attention on the "compelling interest" and "narrowly tailored means" analy-
sis. See infra notes 173-80 and accompanying text.
100. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-48 (1973) (unlike waiver of right
to counsel, effective consent to search does not require knowing and intelligent abandonment
of understood rights).
101. See People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 763, 766, 488 P.2d 630, 634, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306
(1971). In California, prisoners cannot refuse parole. Therefore, the explicit waiver theory
does not apply to a parole condition that would allow searches without a warrant or probable
The flaw in the explicit waiver theory is that a waiver is effective
only if made voluntarily in the "totality of the circumstances." 102 Courts
that use an explicit waiver rationale fail to analyze whether the waiver is
truly voluntary. 0 3 To say that the convict has a right to refuse a condi-
tional release and that he, therefore, has a choice that makes his waiver
voluntary begs the question. The convict is faced with prison on the one
hand and relative freedom on the other. The threat of incarceration casts
serious doubts on the "voluntariness" of the waiver.'
°4
(2) Limits On The Older Theories
Using these theories, most courts either strip or dilute probationers'
fourth amendment rights by excusing the warrant and probable cause
requirements. Even these courts, however, recognize some limits on the
government's power to search.
In more recent cases, courts that use these older theories have held
that, at the least, probationers are entitled to the fourth amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches. Probationers therefore can ar-
gue that a particular search was arbitrary or oppressive. 0 5 Some courts
have limited any particularly lenient rules for probation searches to those
conducted by probation officers. 106 Police officers may not search proba-
tioners without complying with the usual probable cause and warrant
requirements, since they do not share the rehabilitative interests of the
probation agent.10 7
cause. Instead, the California Supreme Court has balanced the parolee's privacy interests
against society's interest in public safety. This balancing approach is applied to parolees, but
not to probationers who explicitly waive their privacy rights. This has led to the anomalous
result that, in California, a parolee may be searched only on "reasonable suspicion" while a
probationer who may never even have been to jail may be searched without a warrant or
probable cause at any time. People v. Bravo, 43 Cal. 3d 600, 608, 738 P.2d 336, 340-41, 238
Cal. Rptr. 282, 286-87 (1987). Cf supra note 16 (arguing that probationers and parolees
should be treated alike).
102. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235-49. A waiver of other constitutional rights requires a
stricter standard. A valid waiver of the sixth amendment right to counsel, for example, must
be knowing and intelligent, as well as voluntary. Id.
103. The courts tend to interpret a purported waiver narrowly, rather than analyzing
whether the waiver is truly voluntary. See, e.g., Mason, 5 Cal. 3d at 765-766, 488 P.2d at 633-
34, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 305-06 (assumes waiver in probation context is voluntary by relying on
Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 634 (1946), a case approving advance waiver in business
context).
104. United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
105. See, e.g., Bravo, 43 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 738 P.2d at 342, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 288; People v.
Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 146-47, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 101 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
953 (1965).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265-66 (9th Cir. 1975).
107. United States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir. 1985); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521
F.2d 246, 250-51 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975) (stressing special nature of parole
agent-parolee relationship). Some courts have held that since a police officer does not share
the rehabilitative interests of the probation system, a condition allowing searches by any law
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Probationers also have the protection of the usual knock-and-an-
nounce rule that requires the searching officer to announce his authority
and purpose before resorting to a forcible entry.'0 8 This rule protects
both the suspect and the officer by decreasing the surprise inherent in a
forcible entry and the resulting possibility of a violent response.
In practice, however, these limitations on the government's search
powers provide scant protection to a probationer's or a parolee's privacy
interests."' 9 As one court stated:
Any search by a parole officer [made] in good faith to determine
whether a paroled prisoner is complying with the conditions of his re-
lease would ... be reasonable. Such a search could become "unreason-
able" only if made too often or if made at an unreasonable hour or if
unreasonably prolonged or for other reasons establishing arbitrary or
oppressive conduct by the parole officer. "0
This standard provides insufficient protection for probationers'
rights. Under this rationale, a court easily could justify the search
through hindsight if the search had uncovered incriminating evidence." '
The simple good faith of a probation agent who has law enforcement as
well as rehabilitative responsibilities is a poor substitute for the neutral
judgment of a magistrate.
12
enforcement officer other than probation agents does not reasonably relate to the goals of
conditional release. See, e.g., Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 265. Searches by police officers,
however, do reasonably relate to the societal protection goals of the probation system. See id.
at 270-71 (Wright, J., dissenting) (allowing police officers to conduct probation searches would
serve two goals: frequent searches that would better protect the public, and minimization of
harm to the probationer-probation agent relationship). In California, a probationer may effec-
tively consent in advance to a search by any law enforcement officer, including police officers.
Bravo, 43 Cal. 3d at 604, 738 P.2d at 336, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
108. The knock-and-announce requirements are excused if the searching officer has a
good-faith reasonable belief that complying with the rule would place the officer in jeopardy or
would substantially increase the probability that the suspect would either flee or destroy evi-
dence. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309
(1958).
109. See White, supra note 82, at 173-76.
110. United States ex rel Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
aff'd, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971).
111. Latta, 521 F.2d at 257 (9th Cir. 1975) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting) ("Post search re-
views of reasonableness neither deter unreasonable searches nor remedy those that have oc-
curred. In all but the most egregious cases, the searching officer will be able retrospectively to
point to specific facts that justified the search." (citations omitted)).
In People v. Bravo, police officers received an anonymous tip from a person claiming to be
Bravo's neighbor. The informant told the police that the volume of foot and vehicle traffic
around Bravo's home caused him to suspect that Bravo was a narcotics dealer. Police officers
conducted a surveillance of Bravo's home but "observed nothing to substantiate the caller's
suspicions ...." Nonetheless, after learning that Bravo was a probationer subject to warrant-
less searches, the police searched Bravo's home. The California Supreme Court upheld the
search under the explicit waiver theory. 43 Cal. 3d at 602-06, 738 P.2d at 336-39, 238 Cal.
Rptr. at 283-85.
112. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
Similarly, limiting the more lenient rules for searches of probation-
ers to those conducted by the probation agent also provides little protec-
tion. Policemen can simply inform probation officers of their suspicions
about a parolee. The parole agent can then either authorize the police to
conduct a search or conduct it himself. "The only restriction placed on
the policeman is that before he can act, he must obtain the approval of an
official who will generally readily cooperate with him."
1 1 3
(3) Modern Theories
Courts abandoning the three older theories' 14 have adopted the "di-
minished expectation of privacy" and the "administrative search" theo-
ries to justify limits on probationer's fourth amendment rights.1 " 5 The
courts that use these theories, however, also fail to properly recognize the
fundamental nature of fourth amendment rights.
a. Diminished Expectation of Privacy
The premise of this theory is that only legitimate expectations of
privacy are protected by the fourth amendment." 6 Courts following this
theory reason that probationers have a lesser expectation of privacy than
the rest of society because of the conditions placed on their release.
These courts afford less protection to this diminished expectation, gener-
ally requiring only "reasonable suspicion" ' 1 7 rather than probable cause.
Trusting probation officers to exercise their discretion properly, many
courts following this theory also do not require a search warrant." 8
113. White, supra note 82, at 175. In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3175 (1987), a
probation officer received a call from someone claiming to be a police officer and reporting that
Griffin may have had guns in his apartment. Although the probation officer could not even
identify the caller, he went ahead and searched Griffin's home. The United States Supreme
Court upheld the search.
114. See supra notes 84-104 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., United States v.Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975) (re-
jecting custody and waiver theories in favor of "reasonable relation" test).
116. See supra notes 16-18, 89 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
118. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 388 N.W.2d 535 (1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct.
3164 (1987). In Griffin, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
"The expectations of privacy of a person on probation cannot be the same as the
expectations of privacy of persons not on probation. It is only the reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy which the fourth amendment protects. Conditions of probation must
at times limit the constitutional freedoms of the probationer. Necessary infringe-
ments on these freedoms are permissible as long as they are not overly broad and are
reasonably related to the person's rehabilitation. By the very nature of probation,
limitations on the liberty and privacy of probationers are imposed. These limitations
are the bases for an exception to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment."
Id. at 55, 388 N.W.2d at 539-40 (quoting State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 647, 653-54, 247 N.W.2d
696, 701 (1976) (emphasis omitted).
The diminished expectation of privacy presumed by the court, however, does not lead
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The problem with this theory is it asks the wrong question. Instead
of asking "What do probationers expect?" these courts should ask,
"What justification is there for diminishing the normal fourth amend-
ment protections?" The latter question properly emphasizes the funda-
mental nature of fourth amendment rights."19 As Justice Peters of the
California Supreme Court, with Justice Tobriner joining, pointed out:
"A diminution of fourth amendment protection ... can be justified
only to the extent actually necessitated by the legitimate demands of
the parole process . . . ." A probationer may be entitled to [only] a
diminished expectation of privacy because of the necessities of the cor-
rectional system, but his expectation may be diminished only to the
extent necessary for his reformation and rehabilitation.
120
Furthermore, the diminished expectation of privacy rationale as ap-
plied to probation and parole searches does not coincide with Supreme
Court cases applying the theory in other contexts. In other instances, the
Court has still required the full measure of probable cause before approv-
ing a search. For example, the Court has consistently held that there is
only a diminished expectation of privacy inside an automobile.12' But a
search of an automobile, unless it falls within the inventory exception,
122
is permissible only when either consent or the full measure of probable
cause exists.1
23
Logically then, the diminished expectation of privacy rationale
should not lead to diminished protections for probationers unless abso-
lutely required by the legitimate demands of the probation system.' 24
The probable cause and warrant requirements should apply to probation
searches, subject to the well-established and specifically delineated excep-
tions already carved out for searches of the general public. One such
exception is that of the "administrative search."
b. Administrative Search
The administrative search theory, as introduced in section I, is the
necessarily to the conclusion that either the warrant or probable cause requirements are ex-
cused. See infra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
120. People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 768, 488 P.2d 630, 635, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 307 (1971)
(Peters, J., dissenting, Tobriner, J., joining) (quoting hI re Martinez, 1 Cal. 3d 641, 647 n.6,
463 P.2d 734, 738, 83 Cal. Rptr. 382, 386, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 857 (1970)) (emphasis in
original) (citations omitted).
121. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1976).
122. Id. at 364.
123. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896-97 (1975); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42, 51 (1970).
124. Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court grounded its decision in Griffin in part on
the diminished expectation of privacy theory, the United States Supreme Court declined to
adopt the theory as applied in the probation context by the Wisconsin court. Griffin v. Wis-
consin, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3167 (1987).
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other modern justification for limiting parolees' and probationers' fourth
amendment rights. 125 Under this approach, courts attempt to balance
the government's interest in rehabilitating convicts and protecting the
public at large against the probationer's interest in retaining his privacy.
This balancing test often results in courts approving searches of proba-
tioners and parolees that clearly would be illegal if carried out on mem-
bers of the general public. 126 The United States Supreme Court used this
theory to uphold the search in Griffin. 127
(4) The Applicability of the Administrative Search Theory to Parolees' and
Probationers' Rights
This section of the Note will first show why the general balancing
approach of the administrative search theory is indeed applicable in the
probation and parole search context. Then, the Note will demonstrate
why neither the pervasively regulated business (Biswell-Colonnade)1
28
nor the neutral criteria (Martinez-Fuerte-Opperman)29 categories of ad-
ministrative search cases are appropriate classifications for probation and
parole searches. Left with the Camara-See type of cases that illustrates
the general balancing approach of the administrative search theory, the
Note will argue that, although this general approach should apply to pa-
role and probation searches, different factors are involved in probation
searches than in the Supreme Court's Camara-See type of cases. These
differences require that the administrative search theory's balance be
struck in favor of the probationer. Thus, both the normal measure of
probable cause and a search warrant should be required.
a. The Balancing Approach
The administrative search theory's balancing approach as applied in
Camara v. Municipal Court 130 and its progeny is applicable to the prob-
lem posed by probation searches. As in the Supreme Court's administra-
tive search cases, probation searches further important governmental
interests other than the usual interest in law enforcement. For example,
in Camara, the primary state interest was assuring housing safety. Simi-
larly, in probation searches, the state interest in the probationer's rehabil-
itation and the general public's protection are paramount. In both
contexts, objectives other than the interest in normal law enforcement
trigger the administrative search theory's balancing process.' 31
125. See supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
126. Griffin, 107 S. Ct. at 3168.
127. Id.
128. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
130. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
131. Griffin, 107 S. Ct. at 3168.
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In Griffin, the United States Supreme Court used the administrative
search theory to uphold a probation search based on a telephone tip that
Griffin may have had guns in his apartment. The Court reasoned that the
state's interest in protection and rehabilitation were special interests be-
yond the need for normal law enforcement. These interests, along with
the resulting need to supervise the probationer, triggered the balancing
approach of the administrative search theory. The Court then relied on a
Wisconsin regulation authorizing probation searches on "reasonable
grounds" to excuse both the probable cause and warrant requirements,
ruling that the search was authorized by a "regulation that itself satisfies
the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement .... -132
As Justice Blackmun's dissent pointed out, however, these special
interests should be a threshold requirement to trigger the balancing pro-
cess and an examination of the practicality of the warrant and probable
cause requirements. Justice Blackmun stated: "[t]he presence of special
... needs justifies resort to the balancing test, but it does not preordain
the necessity of recognizing exceptions to the warrant and probable cause
requirements."'13 3 The government's interest in probation searches does
not justify abandoning of the specific constitutional safeguards of the
warrant clause in favor of the more general "reasonableness" test. Before
abandoning the warrant clause requirements, the Court must ascertain
whether the warrant and probable cause requirements would frustrate
the purpose of the search and whether the administrative safeguards
truly protect fourth amendment interests.
The Court erred in its analysis by failing to categorize the search
within the three general categories of administrative searches. Instead of
first properly classifying the search, the Court simply relied on a regula-
tion allowing searches on "reasonable grounds." 134 If the Court had first
categorized the search, the majority would have realized that it was im-
properly relying on cases such as New York v. Burger, 35 Donovan v.
Dewey, 13 6 and United States v. Biswell137 that define the "pervasively reg-
ulated industry" subcategory 138 of administrative searches. The Court
would also have had to rule out the "neutral criteria" category 139 as de-
fined in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 140 and South Dakota v. Opper-
man. 141 Left with the general balancing approach of the Camara-See
132. Id. at 3167.
133. Id. at 3172 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 3171 n.8.
135. 107 S. Ct. 2636 (1987).
136. 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
137. 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
138. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
140. 428 U.S. 543, 553 (1976).
141. 428 U.S. 364, 374-75 (1976).
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line of cases, 142 the Court would have focused on the "necessity" require-
ment contained in those cases. That requirement dispenses with the prob-
able cause and warrant requirement only when necessary to attain an
adequate level of enforcement. 1
43
b. The Three Categories of Administrative Search Cases
This section of the Note will demonstrate that of the three categories
of administrative searches, 4 4 probation searches are most akin to the
Camara-See category. But as argued below, principled application of the
general Camara rule requires that both the normal measure of probable
cause and the warrant requirement be enforced. 4 5
The Biswell-Colonnade category of administrative searches is an im-
proper classification for probation and parole searches because proba-
tioners are not regulated in the same pervasive fashion as the typical gun
and liquor businesses found in this group. Probation searches are infre-
quent in comparison to the regular routine of inspections in the gun and
liquor industry. 146 Furthermore, searches of either the probationer's per-
son or his home intrude on the probationer's significant privacy inter-
ests.14 7 Most importantly, unlike the detailed regulations that serve to
define and limit the scope and object of the Biswell-type inspection, there
are no limits to the scope or object of a probation search. 48 The proba-
142. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 61. Although the Court stated that a warrant requirement would
frustrate the purpose of the search, the Court failed to analyze the available alternatives before
abandoning those constitutional safeguards. See Griffin, 107 S. Ct. at 3169. For available
alternatives, see infra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
146. See United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 268 (9th Cir. 1975) (Huf-
stedler, J., dissenting) ("To the extent that there is a check on unreasonable searches, it is more
attributable to case overload than to a regard for fourth amendment values; parole officers
simply do not have the time to search many of their parolee's homes.").
147. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Griffin pointed out that the administrative search cases
relied on by the majority all dealt with "closely regulated" businesses that have a reduced
expectation of privacy. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3173 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The search in Griffin took place in the probationer's own home. The Court has
emphasized that the home is at the very core of the fourth amendment's protection and that
"physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the ... fourth amendment is di-
rected .... ." United States v. United States Dist. Court (Plamondon), 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972). Therefore, "[tihe reasoning that may justify an administrative inspection ... [of a
business enterprise without a warrant] simply does not extend to the invasion of the special
privacy .. .of the home." Griffin, 107 S. Ct. at 3173-74 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. Although Wisconsin had a regulation containing the factors that "should" guide a
probation officer's decision to search, the searching officer in Griffin did not even come close to
complying with the regulation. The majority deemed this failure "irrelevant." Id. at 3171 n.8.
Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for ignoring the regulation that gave content to the
"reasonable grounds" standard and defined the steps necessary to ensure that "reasonable
grounds" are present, writing that "[t]his conclusion that the existence of a facial requirement
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tion agent may enter the probationer's home and conduct a wide-ranging
search for evidence of any crime, since a standard condition of probation
is that the probationer not violate any laws.
149
The Martinez-Fuerte-Opperman category of administrative
searches 50 is also an inappropriate analogy for probation cases. Unlike
the searches characteristic of this group, in the probation context, no
regulations effectively limit the searching officer's discretion or otherwise
substantially protect the probationer's fourth amendment interests.' 51
Without such limits, probation searches are as intrusive as searches of
members of the public. The field officer, rather than a high-level supervi-
sor or other disinterested party, is the one that decides whether to search.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly assailed this kind of unfettered
discretion. 152
In the remaining category of cases, the Camara-See group, the
Court has substituted a watered-down measure of probable cause in place
of the traditional measure required for criminal searches. This set of
cases illustrates the general balancing approach of the administrative
search theory. As noted previously, the balancing approach is applicable
to the problem posed by probation searches. 153 For a number of reasons,
however, even the Camara line of cases does not support substituting a
for 'reasonable grounds' automatically satisfies the constitutional protection that a search be
reasonable can only be termed tautological." Id. at 3175 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
149. See supra note 7. Such warrantless searches are also not "necessary" to further the
regulatory scheme since the state has alternative less intrusive means to further probation's
protective and rehabilitative goals. See infra notes 153-60 and accompanying text. The "ne-
cessity" requirement was recently reaffirmed in New York v. Burger, 107 S. Ct. 2636, 2644
(1987). See supra note 61. The majority did not mention this requirement in Griffin. Justice
Blackmun's dissent noted that the "privacy interests of probationers should be ... invaded no
more than is necessary to satisfy probation's dual goals of protecting the public safety and
encouraging the rehabilitation of the probationer." Griffin, 107 S. Ct. at 3174 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
150. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
151. Compare United States v.Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 268 (9th Cir. 1975)
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting) ("[S]tatutes and regulations applicable to the searching [probation
or parole] officer's conduct are non-existent.") with Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,
533 (1967) (broad statutory safeguards that do not set effective limits on the discretion exer-
cised by the field officer or that fail to substantially limit the scope and object of the search are
not an adequate substitute for individualized review). In Griffin, the majority deemed the
probation officer's failure to apply Wisconsin's regulatory standards that should have guided
his decision to search "irrelevant." Griffin, 107 S. Ct. at 3171 n.8. The dissent quoted the
regulation setting forth the factors that the probation agent should have considered. Id. at
3176 n.3. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun, as well as Judge Bablitch of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court, argued that the search did not even meet the administrative guidelines,
much less the constitutional safeguards. Id. at 3175-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 388 N.W.2d 535, 545-46 (1986) (Bablitch, J., dissenting), aff'd,
107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987).
152. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 130-43 and accompanying text.
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watered-down standard of probable cause in most probation search cases.
Although the state interest in rehabilitating the probationer must be
weighed against the privacy interests of the probationer, the factors in-
volved in probation searches are different than those involved in the
Camara-See cases that approve searches without particularized probable
cause. These differences, when weighed on a scale that gives the proper
weight to the fundamental nature of fourth amendment rights, tip the
administrative search theory's balance in favor of the probationer. Both
the normal measure of probable cause and a warrant should be required
in most cases.
The normal measure of probable cause should be required because,
unlike the Camara-See cases, police officers and probation agents can de-
tect many parole violations through normal law enforcement tech-
niques.154 Unlike faulty wiring or other structural defects that are not
visible from outside of a building, parole violations are more like ordi-
nary crimes. Traditional law enforcement tools should be sufficient to
achieve an acceptable level of enforcement.155 For example, commission
of a crime is always a probation violation. 5 6 Securing evidence that a
probationer has committed a crime, such as selling heroin, should be no
more difficult than detecting the same crime committed by a nonproba-
tioner. Additionally, other common violations such as drug and alcohol
abuse, failure to make restitution, or failure to report to the probation
office also can be detected without stripping the probationer of his fourth
amendment rights. Although unlimited search powers would certainly
increase the number of violations that are actually detected, fundamental
fourth amendment rights need not and should not be abridged in the
name of more efficient law enforcement. 157
Furthermore, unlike the contexts in which the Supreme Court has
excused the warrant and probable cause requirements under the adminis-
154. See Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 255-56 (9th Cir.) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975). Justice Blackmun's dissent in Griffin would allow probation
searches based on "reasonable suspicion" rather than on probable cause. Griffin v. Wisconsin,
107 S. Ct. 3164, 3172-73 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although his opinion applies the
"alternative means" approach to invalidate warrantless searches, id. at 3174, it does not ex-
plain why a reduction of the probable cause standard is necessary in light of the available
alternatives such as normal police investigation paired with the probation officer's broad visita-
tion powers.
155. In a particular case, effective supervision may require limits on that probationer's
privacy rights. In such cases, the releasing court or parole board should impose a condition
before the probationer is released and specifically advise the probationer why such a condition
is necessary in his particular case. Such conditions would be subject to review under the "nar-
rowly tailored means" prong of the compelling interest test. See ihfra notes 173-80 and ac-
companying text.
156. See supra note 7.
157. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62 (1967).
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trative search theory, 158 probation searches are highly intrusive' 59 and
are often aimed at discovering evidence of crime. Additionally, the gov-
ernment can effectively serve its interests through less intrusive methods
such as visitation 160 and reporting requirements. The state, therefore,
does not need to conduct warrantless probation searches without prob-
able cause to further the goals of the probation system. Because these
alternative methods effectively serve the governmental interests and be-
cause warrantless searches cause substantial harm to the probationer's
legitimate privacy interests, the balance of the administrative search the-
ory should be struck in favor of the probationer.
B. The Warrant Requirement
Even courts that use the modem diminished expectation of privacy
and administrative search theories to define probationer's fourth amend-
ment rights generally do not require the searching officer to obtain a war-
rant before the search. 161 This exemption from the warrant requirement,
in combination with the low standards presently required by courts to
validate probation searches, places the probationer's privacy in the hands
of his probation agent. As a result, the agent has unfettered discretion;
no neutral and detached magistrate stands between the agent and the
probationer. 162
Unlike the institutional settings of the searches in Hudson v.
Palmer 63 and New Jersey v. T.L.O.,164 in which the government had an
overriding interest in maintaining security and being prepared for imme-
diate action,165 no overriding interest justifies a blanket exemption from
the warrant requirement for searches conducted in probationers' and pa-
rolees' homes. Because the probationer is not in confinement, the essen-
tial goals of maintaining institutional security and discipline" 166 that are
present in both the prison and school contexts167 are absent in the proba-
tion and parole contexts.
158. See supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
160. Cf Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971) (visitation requirement imposed as condi-
tion of receiving welfare benefits is constitutional).
161. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 58, 388 N.W.2d 535, 541 (1986), aff'd,
107 S. Ct. 3164 (1987); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
897 (1975); United States v Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 249, 266 (9th Cir. 1975).
162. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
163. 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in prison).
164. 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (at school, teacher may search student without a warrant and
with only reasonable suspicion).
165. See supra notes 43, 89 and accompanying text.
166. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 107 S. Ct. 3164, 3172 n.2 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 46 (1979)).
167. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 (school); Palmer, 468 U.S. at 526 (prison); Wolfish, 441
U.S. at 545-47 (prison).
Furthermore, a warrant requirement would not frustrate any other
legitimate governmental purpose behind the search. To meet any exi-
gency, probation agents would have the benefit of the traditional excep-
tions to the warrant requirement. 68  In addition, a magistrate may
consider the fact that a suspect is on probation or parole when deciding
whether probable cause to search exists in the "totality of the circum-
stances." 169 The traditional exigency exceptions and consideration of pa-
role status in the probable cause determination should effectively serve
the state interest in protecting members of the general public without
sacrificing the probationer's fundamental constitutional rights.
Warrantless searches also harm the state's interests in rehabilitating
parolees and probationers. Although explicitly requiring the probationer
to submit to warrantless searches by his probation agent as a condition of
probation may theoretically serve to put him "on notice" that he may be
searched at any time, in reality the probationer will feel either harassed
by frequent searches or surprised by a rare and infrequent search. This
unnecessary intrusion into his privacy can only serve as a roadblock on
the path to rehabilitation.
The probationer who has been excused from jail in the hopes that he
will become a law-abiding citizen is thus subject to what he may well
perceive as lawless and random searches by the very person who is en-
trusted with the responsibility of overseeing and guiding his hoped-for
rehabilitation. 170 Such seeming lawlessness can hardly inspire the proba-
tioner's confidence and trust in either his probation agent' 7 ' or in the rule
168. Cf Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967) ("[N]othing we say today is
intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant, that the law has tradition-
ally upheld in emergency situations." (citations omitted)). In his dissent in Griffin, Justice
Blackmun stated:
If in a particular case there is a compelling need to search the home of a probationer
without delay, then it is possible for a search to be conducted immediately under the
established exception for exigent circumstances. There is no need to create a separate
warrant exception for probationers. The existing exception provides a probation
agent with all the flexibility the agent needs.
Griffin, 107 S. Ct. at 3174 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
No exigency existed under the facts in Griffin. The probation officer waited two to three
hours from the time he received the tip until the time he searched Griffin's home. Id. These
two to three hours should have been sufficient time to submit an affidavit and application for a
search warrant to a magistrate.
169. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983).
170. Cf New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 354 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). In T.L.O., Justice Brennan referred to the need for teachers to obey
fourth amendment commandments: "It would be incongruous and futile to charge teachers
with the task of embuing their students with an understanding of our system of constitutional
democracy, while at the same time immunizing those same teachers from the need to respect
constitutional protections." Id.
Probation agents, like schoolteachers, are responsible for teaching their charges the value
of obeying the law and living responsibly in society.
171. Justice Blackmun made a similar observation in Griffin v. Wisconsin:
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of law. Teaching a probationer that the law will not respect his right to
privacy will also teach him not to respect the law. 172
IV. Proposal
Since the fourth amendment is a fundamental constitutional right
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, 173 its protections should be
abridged only when the state can demonstrate a compelling interest in
doing so.174 Moreover, the means used to achieve the state's compelling
interest should be narrowly tailored so as to inflict the least damage to
constitutional freedoms. If alternatives less restrictive of constitutional
rights exist, those means must be used. Unless the state can show a com-
pelling need to do so, the Constitution prohibits the government from
simply declaring that a certain class of persons no longer possesses fourth
amendment rights.1
75
Although the state's interests in rehabilitating offenders and in pro-
tecting society are certainly important, limitations on fourth amendment
rights are unnecessary and therefore not narrowly tailored to achieve the
state interest.176 Instead of imposing a blanket denial of fourth amend-
ment rights, the state should use the other less intrusive means at its
disposal to effectuate its interests.
For example, probation agents have broad visitation powers over
their charges.177 During such a visit, probation agents may use the
I fail to see how the role of the probation agent in "foster[ing] growth and develop-
ment of the client".. . is enhanced the slightest bit by the ability to conduct a search
without the checks provided by prior neutral review. If anything, the power to
search will prove a barrier to establishing any degree of trust between agent and
[probationer].
107 S. Ct. at 3174 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
172. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites
anarchy.").
173. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
174. Other fundamental privacy rights are protected with a compelling interest test. See,
e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
175. Cf Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (applying strict scrutiny to classi-
fication penalizing the fundamental "right to travel"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942) (Strict scrutiny applied to law requiring sterilization to certain groups of criminals).
176. See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
177. Cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). Wyman is not completely analogous to
probation searches because the Wyman Court stressed that welfare workers have no criminal
law enforcement duties. Furthermore, the welfare visit was announced in advance. In con-
trast to Wyman, probation agents do have responsibility for enforcing criminal laws. Further-
more, advance warning is rare since such a warning may well frustrate the purpose of the
search. Nonetheless, visits are comparatively nonintrusive and are necessary to effectively
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"plain view" exception 178 to seize evidence. Observations made during a
visit, combined with the parolee's status and prior record may well show
probable cause to search, in the "totality of the circumstances.' '179 Addi-
tionally, exigent circumstances may permit a full-scale search as a result
of observations made during the course of a visit.' 80
To protect the fourth amendment rights of probationers and parol-
ees as a class, the exclusionary rule' 8 ' should apply at revocation hear-
ings. In addition to providing a remedy for searches that violate the
warrant and probable cause requirements, extending the rule to revoca-
tion hearings would also deter police officers from using a probation
agent as a "stalking horse" since both the officer and the agent would
have to obey the same constitutional mandate. Both would have to com-
ply with the warrant and probable cause requirements. The same excep-
tions to the warrant requirement would be available to both the police
officer and the probation agent. Furthermore, extending the exclusion-
ary rule eliminates the incentive for police to gamble that the person they
are searching is a probationer or parolee. Generally limiting the rule's
exceptions will increase its deterrent effect in situations other than the
parole search by reducing the possibility that a search will fall fortui-
tously within one of the rule's exceptions.1 82
monitor rehabilitation. Conditions requiring visitations should therefore pass the "compelling
interest" and "narrowly tailored means" test.
If the Supreme Court does allow specially lenient rules for probation searches (such as
allowing searches on "reasonable suspicion" without a warrant) because of the the state's reha-
bilitative interest, the agent should, at the least, be required to make an independent judgment
of whether a search is warranted. Rather than ruling that failure to comply with administra-
tive regulations designed to guide the officer's decision to search is "irrelevant," the Court
should evaluate compliance with regulations in the same manner that it evaluates compliance
with the "neutral and detached magistrate" requirement in other fourth amendment cases.
The agent would take the place of the magistrate and he must be provided with facts rather
than mere conclusory allegations. The evidence in Grifin which showed that someone identi-
fying himself as a police officer informed the probation office that Griffin "may have had guns
in his apartment" would not meet this requirement. Reliance on such a tip without independ-
ent corroboration would leave probationers vulnerable to a search whenever someone with a
grudge against him decided to call the police or the probation office.
178. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-72 (1971).
179. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
180. For instance, the agent may believe that both probaole cause to search as well as a
substantial danger that the probationer will flee or destroy evidence exists. See Latta v. Fitz-
harris, 521 F.2d 246, 258 (9th Cir.) (Hufstedler, J., dissenting), cert. denied. 423 U.S. 897
(1975).
181. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
182. See United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 821 (7th Cir. 1971) (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
Judge Fairchild stated:
The broader the cumulative exceptions, the greater the probability that the fruits of
an unlawful search will turn out to be useful, and the weaker the deterrence from
unlawful searching engendered by the rule. The very breadth of exceptions to the
exclusionary rule render it less effective than it otherwise would be, and counsels
against recognition of further exceptions as long as we rely on it at all.
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Rather than changing the current rule, that there is no general right
to counsel at revocation hearings, courts should treat fourth amendment
claims as another "special circumstance" that would entitle the proba-
tioner to a due process right to appointed counsel.18 3 Judges should
screen claims and appoint counsel when there is a substantial likelihood
that the probationer's rights have been violated.
Conclusion
This Note has argued that probationers and parolees should have
the same constitutional protections as the general public. The state must
demonstrate a compelling need before abridging constitutional freedoms.
If the state can demonstrate a compelling interest, it must minimize dam-
age to constitutional rights by using only the most narrowly tailored
method of achieving those ends.
Although the state's interest in protecting the rest of society by re-
habilitating probationers and parolees is compelling, limitations of fourth
amendment rights are unnecessary to achieve that end. Visitation and
reporting requirements, along with normal law enforcement methods, are
sufficient to achieve the state interests. Therefore, warrantless searches
and searches on less than probable cause are unconstitutional.
Furthermore, such searches may injure, rather than promote, the
state's interests. 184 Searches conducted on the theory that arbitrary
Id.
183. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973). Special circumstances entitling
the probationer to a due process right to counsel exist whenever
the probationer or parolee makes such a request [for counsel], based on a timely and
colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions
upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public
record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the
violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or
otherwise difficult to develop or present.
Id. at 790. Judges should screen claims and appoint counsel when there is a substantial likeli-
hood that the probationer's rights have been violated. Compare the special circumstances
right to counsel rule for state felony prosecutions adopted in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462
(1942) with the per se rule adopted in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
Illegal searches by police officers or probation agents do not justify or mitigate the proba-
tioner's conduct. That is no reason not to apply the exclusionary rule, however. Presently, the
prosecution cannot use illegally seized evidence at a non-probationer's trial because of the
deterrence principle and because it would be inappropriate for the state to profit from its own
wrongdoing. Similarly, law enforcement officers should not profit from their illegal action just
because the victim of the illegality is a probationer. Thus, probation revocation would be
"inappropriate." The probationer should have the right to appointed counsel would then be
required since fourth amendment jurisprudence is "complex and difficult to develop." Ga-
gnon, 411 U.S. at 790.
184. People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 770, 488 P.2d 630, 637, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 309 (1971)
(Peters, J., dissenting, Tobriner, J., joining) ("Such searches measure the effectiveness of reha-
bilitation in the same manner that one fells a tree to measure its age.").
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searches will deter criminal conduct will only drive a wedge between the
probation agent and the probationer. The probationer should not be
treated like a prisoner. Probation agents should teach by example, not by
fear. "It is high time that we recognized that a person must have the
freedom to be responsible if he is to become responsibly free."'
' 8 5
185. Id.
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